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Abstract
This paper tests the "lock−in" effect of mortgage contract terms and establishes the link
between changes in market interest rates and homeowner mobility. The analysis is based on
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics during 1990−1993, when mortgage interest rates
declined by almost 30 percent
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I. Introduction
When interest rates vary, the value to a homeowner of a fixed-rate mortgage varies as
well.  In particular, if mortgages are not fully assumable, then when interest rates increase, the
value of a pre-existing mortgage contract increases as well.  Thus, homeowners have an
incentive to postpone moving in response to other economic incentives.  Similarly, when interest
rates decrease, households who had previously postponed moving now have this disincentive
removed.  The only empirical evidence on the magnitude of this effect is based upon analyses of
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) during 1979-1981, a period of unusual volatility
and increasing interest rates during 1979-1981. (Potepan 1989, Quigley 1987)
This paper investigates the importance of these mortgage contract terms upon mobility
during a more typical environment, the early 1990s, when much lower interest rates declined
even further.  Thus, it investigates the implications for mobility of a decline in the "lock in"
effect of mortgage contracts. We analyze household behavior, also using the PSID, but during
the 1990-93 period when mortgage yields on new purchases declined by almost 30 percent (from
10 to a little over 7 percentage points). Any incentive to delay residential moves due to
unfavorable mortgage terms declined during this period of analysis.
We find strong evidence that certain demographic factors and market conditions --
changes in the head of household, an increase in family size, appreciation in house values --
affect family mobility prospects.  The evidence about the importance of mortgage contracts upon
mobility is more ambiguous.  In a simple proportional hazards framework, there is little evidence
of a relationship in these more recent data.  However, when the model is extended to investigate
non proportional responses -- that is, when the mobility response to changes in mortgage
conditions is allowed to vary with the household's current length of tenure -- a systematic pattern
emerges.  For households who have lived in their current dwellings for more than a decade, a
decline in the financial value of a mortgage significantly increases the probability of household
mobility.  These effects are small relative to demographic influences upon household mobility
however.
II. Mortgage Terms and Household Mobility
The financial conditions underlying home mortgages may represent substantial
transactions costs, inhibiting residential mobility.  Beyond prepayment penalties, households
may incur losses whenever they hold mortgages whose coupon interest rates are higher than
those charged for new mortgages of equivalent maturities.  If mortgage contracts were assumable
and if their financial terms were fully capitalized into house prices, then current homeowners
could always realize the financial advantages of favorable mortgage terms upon selling the
house.  Neither of these conditions holds (See Durning and Quigley, 1985).
The financial advantage arising from ownership of a mortgage at contract interest rate i,
when the interest rate charged on new first mortgages is r, depends upon the monthly payment P
for debt service and the remaining term to maturity η .  With fixed-rate, level-payment
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where B is the unpaid balance of the mortgage at time j=1 and Y is a vector of contractual terms
and interest rates, Y(P,B,i,r,η ).
Of course, the financial incentives summarized by the g[ ] function are not the only
reason, or even the most important reason, why mobility rates vary across homeowners.
Housing demand and residential mobility vary with a wide range of sociodemographic
characteristics of households (Quigley and Weinberg, 1977).  Let the conditional hazard of
mobility, h(t), depend upon Y and a vector X of sociodemographic characteristics, i.e., 
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where  0 h  is the baseline hazard, a function of duration alone.  Assume further π  is separable in
the form
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where the β ’s are parameters.  As indicated in (3), it may be reasonable to presume that the
importance of mortgage terms and interest rates is not independent of tenure time.  For example,
if households’ attachments to neighborhoods increases over time (see Dynarski, 1985), then the
same increase in the transactions costs of moving may affect the mobility incentives of
households (and their hazards of moving) quite differently depending upon length of tenure.  The
proportionality assumption can be tested in a straightforward manner, by testing the hypothesis
that 0 3 = β  in equation (3).
This specification was estimated using the 1979-81 PSID to evaluate the effects of
mortgage terms upon homeowner mobility (Results are presented in Quigley, 1987, page 639).
III. New Results from the 1990s
During 1991 and 1992, the PSID survey asked household respondents to indicate their
remaining mortgage balances and the remaining term to maturity of their mortgages.  The survey
also asked households to indicate their gross monthly payments and the portion of payments
reserved for insurance and property taxes.  In principle, this identifies the contractual interest
rate.
Despite the care taken in verifying data by PSID researchers, it was necessary to exclude
a substantial fraction of the sample of homeowners from the statistical analysis.  Of the 4,871
homeowner households surveyed in 1991, it was possible to obtain consistent information on
2085; of the 5079 homeowners surveyed in 1992, complete data were available for 2,662.  (The
steps taken to verify data and to eliminate observations are reported in Quigley, 2001).
Of course, these samples include a substantial fraction of households -- about forty
percent -- who have no mortgages at all.  For those households, the mortgage premium is zero
(and is unaffected by interest rates).  Table 1 indicates the distribution of mortgage premia, and
shows a substantial mass point at zero.
Table 2 reports the results of a series of hazard models that include household
demographics as well as the financial variables whose distribution is summarized in Table 1.Table 1
Distribution of Mortgage Premium
A. Premium in Dollars
  1991             1992
Premium Frequency    Percent Frequency    Percent
<-$10,000 155 7.43% 306 11.94%
-$10,000 to -$5,000 144 6.91% 244 9.52%
-$5,000 to -$2,500 154 7.39% 160 6.25%
-$2,500 to -$1,000 112 5.37% 148 5.78%
-$1,000 to -$0.01 96 4.60% 93 3.63%
$0 898 43.07% 1091 42.58%
$0.01 to $1,000 107 5.13% 100 3.90%
$1,000 to $2,500 83 3.98% 112 4.37%
$2,500 to $5,000 111 5.32% 111 4.33%
$5,000 to $10,000 110 5.28% 109 4.25%
>$10,000 115 5.52% 88 3.43%
Total Observations 2,085 100.00% 2,562 100.00%
B. Premium/Value
   1991              1992
Premium/Value Frequency    Percent Frequency    Percent
<-0.25 35 1.68% 79 3.08%
-0.25 to -0.10 153 7.34% 272 10.62%
-0.10 to -0.05 155 7.43% 240 9.37%
-0.05 to -0.0001 318 15.25% 360 14.05%
0 898 43.07% 1091 42.58%
0.0001 to 0.05 292 14.00% 321 12.53%
0.05 to 0.10 115 5.52% 105 4.10%
0.10 to 0.25 100 4.8% 78 3.04%
>0.25 19 0.91% 16 0.62%
Total Observations 2,085 100.00% 2,562 100.00%
Note: Mortgage Premium is defined in equation (1) as the PDV of the mortgage at the
contract rate minus the PDV at the current rate for new mortgages.Table 2
Basic Hazard Models of Household Mobility
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
         Model






Premium* Dummy for positive 0.067
(x10
4) (0.59)
Premium* Dummy for negative 0.112
(x10
4) (1.22)
(Premium/Value)*(Dummy for pos) 0.637
(0.58)
(Premium/Value)*(Dummy for neg) 0.388
(0.72)
Increase in Family Size 0.662 * 0.662 * 0.661 * 0.663 *
(number) (9.80) (9.81) (9.76) (9.85)
Decrease in Family Size 0.097 0.094 0.095 0.095
(number) (0.62) (0.60) (0.61) (0.61)
Family Income 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1,000's of dollars) (0.51) (0.49) (0.57) (0.47)
Age of Head -0.016 * -0.016 * -0.016 * -0.016 *
(years) (2.24) (2.23) (2.26) (2.18)
Education of Head 0.055 ** 0.054 ** 0.056 ** 0.054 **
(years) (1.66) (1.65) (1.67) (1.65)
Family Size 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012
(number) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
Black Household -0.366 ** -0.364 ** -0.365 ** -0.366 **
(1=yes) (1.72) (1.70) (1.71) (1.71)
Other NonWhite Household 0.081 0.078 0.086 0.072
(1=yes) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17)
New Family Head 1.330 * 1.336 * 1.331 * 1.336 *
(6.53) (6.57) (6.54) (6.59)
Chi-Square 273.62 269.83 274.88 271.67
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 10% level3
These demographic variables are identical to those used in the previous analysis of PSID data.
The pattern of these coefficients is very similar to previous results.  Increases in family size are
significantly related to household mobility, but decreases in family size have no statistically
significant impact.  Younger households and those with more education are more likely to move
in any given year.  Neither the level of income nor the size of the family is significantly related
to household mobility.  There is some evidence that, holding other factors constant, black
homeowners are less likely to move than whites.
Although the Chi squared statistic indicates that each of the models is highly significant,
there is little evidence that mortgage financial terms affected household mobility during this
period of declining interest rates.
Table 3 reports the results from an expanded set of variables.  First, in Models E through
H we delete the four demographic variables which are clearly insignificant in the models
reported in Table 2.  Second, following Keil (1994) we include a measure of the one-year house
price appreciation experienced by each household.  This is computed from the self-assessed
house values reported for each homeowner.  Third, following Wu (1997) we include measures of
the current loan-to-value ratio for each household as well as its monthly housing payment-to-
income ratio.  Wu argues that these two variables help identify those constrained households
who cannot refinance in response to interest rate declines.  Fourth, we estimate models which
relax the assumption of proportionality in the relationship between mortgage terms and
household mobility.
The Chi squared statistics reported in Table 3 are larger than for the previous models,
reflecting the increased statistical significance of the results.  There is strong evidence that
household mobility decisions are related to increases in family size, the existence of a new head
of household, the age, education, and race of the head of household, and is sensitive to recent
appreciation in housing prices.  There is no indication that mobility decisions are responsive to
loan-to-value ratios or to payment-to-income ratios.
Allowing for a non proportional relationship between the valuation of mortgage terms
and household mobility significantly increases the statistical power of the models.  Moreover, the
coefficient on the non proportionality term is consistently negative and is of the same order of
magnitude as the coefficient on the proportionality term.  This suggests that, after only a few
years of tenure, the possession of a mortgage on terms more favorable than the current market
does cause households to postpone moving decisions.  The possession of mortgages on favorable
terms does affect mobility decisions, but its effect varies with the length of household tenure in
its dwelling.
IV. Implications and Conclusions
When the effect of favorable mortgage terms on mobility behavior is allowed to vary
with length of tenure, the results from the reanalysis of the PSID are quite consistent.  After a
few years of living at the same address, households become less likely to move as the value of
their mortgages is larger relative to the cost of a new mortgage at current interest rates.
This result persists when value of the mortgage premium is measured in dollars or as a
fraction of the value of the house.  This general result is found in simple models (not reported
here) that measure only the effects of mortgage terms upon mobility patterns and also in more
complex models that measure household demographics as well.
The magnitude of these effects can be simulated using these statistical models. Consider,
Model F, the preferred specification.  Define the "base case" as the cumulative householdTable 3
Expanded Non-Proportional Hazard Models of Mobility
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
           Model
       Covariate E F G H
A. Proportional Component
Mortgage Premium 0.157 *
(x10
4)( 2 . 0 7 )
Premium/House Value 1.864 **
(1.78)
Premium* Dummy for positive 0.077
(x10
4) (0.56)
Premium* Dummy for negative 0.341
(x10
4) (1.45)
(Premium/Value)*(Dummy for pos) 0.700
(0.36)
(Premium/Value)*(Dummy for neg) 3.096
(1.43)
Increase in Family Size 0.678 * 0.676 * 0.676 * 0.676 *
(number) (9.87) (9.91) (9.77) (9.78)
Age of Head -0.015 ** -0.015 ** -0.015 ** -0.015 **
(years) (1.88) (1.84) (1.86) (1.83)
Education of Head 0.058 ** 0.058 ** 0.060 ** 0.058 **
(years) (1.81) (1.82) (1.82) (1.81)
Black Household -0.347 -0.369 ** -0.345 -0.358 **
(1=yes) (1.63) (1.72) (1.62) (1.65)
New Family Head 1.370 * 1.377 * 1.360 * 1.364 *
(6.73) (6.79) (6.73) (6.68)
Household Value Appreciation (in$$) 0.019 ** 0.021 * 0.021 * 0.021 *
(x10
4) (1.96) (2.15) (2.29) (2.18)
Loan to Value Ratio 0.029 0.030 0.052 0.084
(0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.30)
Payment to Income Ratio -0.111 -0.197 -0.071 -0.218
(0.19) (0.35) (0.13) (0.39)
B.  Non-Proportional Component
Premium * In tenure -0.067
(x10
4)( 1 . 1 3 )
Premium* Dummy for positive* In tenure -0.021
(x10
4) (0.21)
Premium* Dummy for negative* In tenure -0.164
(x10
4) (1.23)
(Prem/Val)* In tenure -1.173 **
(1.70)
(Prem/Val)* Dummy for positive* In tenure -0.582
(0.40)
(Prem/Val)* Dummy for negative* In tenure -1.738 **
(1.68)
Chi-Square 296.99 296.99 296.99 296.99
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 10% level4
mobility rate estimated from Model F assuming that a household of the sample average
demographic characteristics takes out a level-payment 30-year mortgage to finance 80 percent of
the purchase price of the average house, obtaining a 7 percent mortgage.  For years 13 (the mean
tenure of homeowners) through 30, the cumulative changes in mobility arising from changes in
age and mortgage balances can be computed.
For comparison with this base case, we can compute the mortgage premium, assuming
that interest rates  change in year 13 and then remain constant.  The stream of payments for the
remaining 17 years is valued using the new interest rate.  The mortgage premium Pi associated









where Ci is the unpaid mortgage principal remaining at year i, and D is the annual mortgage
payment.  Given these computations, the coefficients of Model F can be used to estimate
mobility rates.
Figure 1 illustrates these mobility responses graphically. As indicated in the figure, the
differences in mobility rates are small.  They suggest that a 6 percentage point swing in interest
rates is associated with about a 3 percentage point change in cumulative mobility rates over the
remaining life of the mortgage.
Overall, the quantitative results confirm the effects of interest rate changes on
homeowner mobility in the housing market.  Increases in interest rates do inhibit the mobility of
the holders of residential mortgages.  Declines in interest rates reduce the transactions cost of
adjustments in housing consumption by homeowners.Figure 1
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